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Abstract
This paper provides exploratory evidence on corporate governance (CG) and corporate social
responsibility (CSR) interfaces. Although there remains a voluminous literature on CG and
CSR, very little effort has been put forward to explore the nature of this relationship. Using
interviews with senior executives of New Zealand Stock Exchange (NZX) listed firms, this
research assesses CG and CSR practices, identifies barriers for CG and CSR adoption, and
investigates the nature of the relationship between CG and CSR. The results indicate a
moderate level of CG and CSR practices, with lack of resources and cost-time balance as
common barriers for CG and CSR adoption. However, despite these barriers, we note that the
majority of executives appreciate the increasing convergence between CG and CSR and believe
that a more robust CG framework will lead to more sustainable CSR practices. These findings
have important implications for managers and policymakers interested in understanding the
CG-CSR nexus and promoting responsible business practices.

Keywords: corporate governance; corporate social responsibility; stakeholder theory;
interviews; thematic analysis.
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Introduction

The new millennium has witnessed a dramatic increase in social-, environmental- and
governance-related scandals. Some well-known examples are the Deepwater BP oil spill
(2010) and the Volkswagen emissions scandal (2015), where a common characteristic across
them is the interplay between corporate governance (CG) and corporate social responsibility
(CSR) (Goranova & Ryan, 2015; Jain & Zaman, 2019). Such scandals have stimulated
academic interest and research has been carried out to understand the interdependencies,
synergies and convergence between CG and CSR (Jain & Jamali, 2016). However, the majority
of CG and CSR research has ignored the managerial perception and has failed to develop our
understanding of CG and CSR interrelationships (Jain & Jamali, 2016; Scherer & Voegtlin,
2020; Zaman & Roudaki, 2019).
Despite this lack in the literature, some studies have explored the nature of the CG-CSR
relationship, particularly those examining the inter-relationship from a managerial perspective.
For example, on the one hand, Jamali et al. (2008), drawing on in-depth interviews with the
top managers of eight companies operating in Lebanon, find that the majority of managers
conceive CG, as a pre-requisite for CSR. On the other hand, Young and Thyil (2014),
interviewing managers from Australia, the United Kingdom (UK) and India, reveal that
managers perceive CSR as a dimension of CG. Similarly, Kolk and Pinkse (2010) note an
overlap of CG and CSR in CSR reports of multinational companies, while Elkington (2006)
and Amoako (2017) consider CG and CSR as coexisting components of the same continuum.
The underlying relationship between CG and CSR is centred on managerial thoughts,
perceptions and contextual setting, and ignoring these characteristics leads to inconclusive
results in the literature (Jain & Jamali, 2016; Kabir & Thai, 2017; Mansi et al., 2017; Tilt, 2016;
Young & Thyil, 2014).
This paper uses a qualitative approach to answer an unexplored research question in the
New Zealand Stock Exchange (NZX) context: How do NZX listed firms’ executives perceive
the nature of the relationship between CG and CSR? This question is important in the New
Zealand framework due to the recently revised 2017 NZX CG code. The revised CG code
emphasises the role of the board of directors in considering environmental and social factors
for the protection of stakeholders’ interests. In addition, this code encourages firms to develop
and disclose a code of ethics, board committee charters and other governance documents to
investors and stakeholders (New Zealand Stock Exchange, 2017). These requirements pre3

determine good CG as a pre-requisite for CSR practices. However, considering the divergent
findings in the literature on the nature of the CG-CSR relationship, there is a timely need for
the managerial views of that relationship. In addition, the understanding of the CG-CSR
relationship is even more important for executives in firms in smaller markets, like New
Zealand’s, where unique attributes of firms, such as smaller size, financial constraints, remote
proximity, etc., worsen the problems concerning the effective implementation of CG and CSR.
To answer our study’s research question, we interviewed 12 senior executives of ‘CSR
champion’ NZX listed firms, i.e., firms following the Global Reporting Initiatives (GRI)
principles in implementing CG and CSR practices.
The interview analysis for the assessment of CG practices suggests the dominance of
compliance, transparency and disclosure-related governance aspects, such as the presence of
highly concentrated ownership structures, well-structured and gender-diverse boards –
including board independence, board committees and board gender diversity – and the presence
of organisational codes. However, we find a limited number of firms having remuneration
policies for board members and executives, with very few following a CSR-based matrix for
executive remuneration.
The assessment of CSR reveals that our sampled firms seem to establish an environmentalfocused CSR concept due to community concerns, concentrating on ‘waste management’ and
‘emissions reduction’ initiatives – as New Zealand communities see the environment as
important for their ‘clean and green’ image.
Exploring the barriers for CG and CSR adoption, our findings indicate that compliance
costs and the lack of shareholder activism are barriers to effective CG adoption, while the lack
of resources, framework complexity and limited understanding about the CSR process are
highlighted as barriers for CSR implementation.
In terms of the nature of the relationship between CG and CSR, we find three conjectures.
First, the executives believe CG is a pillar of CSR – pointing towards the notion that effective
CSR requires a solid CG be in place. Second, CSR as a dimension of CG – accentuating the
non-financial risk mitigation functions of CG. Third, both CG and CSR are part of the same
continuum, i.e., CG-CSR coexistence – with the idea that corporate performance (including
CSR) and conformance (CG) go hand-in-hand. In addition, although we identify three potential
conjectures relating to the CG-CSR relationship in New Zealand – CG as a pillar of CSR, CSR
as a dimension of CG and CG-CSR coexistence – it is noted that CG as a pillar of CSR is
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highlighted by respondents as having particular significance. This implies that effective CG
promotes firms’ CSR practices, supporting stakeholder centric CG perspective.
Our paper makes several contributions to both the CG and CSR literature. First, we not
only extend the research on the CG-CSR relationship by interviewing the top executives of
firms in the smaller developed market of New Zealand (Jain & Jamali, 2016) but also add a
more nuanced perspective by exploring the barriers for companies to incorporate CG and CSR.
Second, the bulk of the CG and CSR literature has adopted a ‘black box approach’, i.e., a causal
relationship between CG and CSR, ignoring the managerial perceptions and contextual setting
which have raised mixed research findings (Aguilera et al., 2015; Jain & Jamali, 2016). Third,
our study responds to recent calls for an inductive approach in the CG-CSR literature to take
steps towards unravelling the CG-CSR relationship (Aguilera et al., 2015; Jain & Jamali, 2016;
McNulty et al., 2013).
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. We first provide some background
information on New Zealand in section 2. We then summarize the recent relevant literature in
section 3. Section 4 outlines the methodology of this study and Section 5 discusses the results
of our analysis. Finally, section 6 concludes.

New Zealand Background

New Zealand is a small and open economy, known for its business-friendly policies. The
NZX and the Financial Market Authority (FMA) are accountable for promoting responsible
business practices among listed firms. Businesses in New Zealand enjoy a relatively flexible
CG and CSR legislative structure compared with their Anglo-Saxon counterparts Australia, the
UK, the US and Canada (Reddy et al., 2008). New Zealand provides a unique environment to
explore CG-CSR relationship. This is because NZ listed companies are only required to
disclose some of the CG characteristics. For instance, listed companies in New Zealand are
only required to disclose the equity interest of board members, ignoring the disclosure of
CEOs’ and other high-level executives’ equity ownership. This non-disclosure of CEOs’ and
executives’ remuneration triggers conflict between management and directors. Thus, the CEO
and executives with a high equity interest might not be willing to undertake or effectively
implement expensive CSR activities, thereby compromising the interests of other stakeholders’
groups (Zaman, 2018). This has been more recently captured by Dobbs and Van Staden (2016).
Their results suggest that in New Zealand, companies are not currently fully committed to CSR.
5

In most cases, CSR is used only to create the impression of being concerned about society and
stakeholders. This not only raises significant questions about these companies’ commitment to
CSR but also about their CG practices.
Historically, CSR has not gained much management attention within the New Zealand
context (Wells et al., 2014), while the opposite is found in CG, which has remained dominant
due to its legal compliance requirements (Cassidy, 2017; Fauzi & Locke, 2012; Hay et al.,
2017; Reddy, 2010). However, considering the growing prevalence of CG and CSR around the
world, the NZX revised its best practice CG code in 2017 and included a clause about
environmental, social and governance (ESG) disclosure, thus encouraging companies to adopt
a more comprehensive responsible business approach (Zaman & Nadeem, 2019). The revised
2017 NZX CG code pays special attention to CSR issues, aiming to promote ESG activities for
listed companies.
Despite the growing literature on CG and CSR, research in New Zealand remains very
limited, with little focus on the CG-CSR relationship. In New Zealand, the majority of studies
have individually focused on CSR (Bebbington et al., 2009; De Silva & Forbes, 2016; Dobbs
& Van Staden, 2016) or CG (Cassidy, 2017; Fauzi & Locke, 2012; Hay et al., 2017; Reddy,
2010), and almost no attempt has been made to understand the CG-CSR interfaces. Therefore,
considering the contextual dependencies of CG and CSR, it is important to explore managerial
perceptions about the nature of the relationship using a New Zealand setting
Literature Review
CG and CSR definitions
CG and CSR are socially constructed terms which have evolved over time (Dahlsrud,
2008; Ocasio & Joseph, 2005). Due to their interdisciplinary nature, there is no single agreed
definition for either CG or CSR in the literature (Jain & Jamali, 2016). For instance, some
scholars define CG as the way in which suppliers of corporate finance assure themselves of
getting a return on their investment (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Others focus to adopt a
managerial perspective and refer to CG as the set of “formal structures, informal structures,
and processes that exist in oversight roles and responsibilities in the corporate context”
(Hambrick et al., 2008, p. 381). These multiple definitions make it complex to assess what
effective or good CG means. However, we followed Aguilera et al. (2015) and
conceptualisation CG based on four key elements. First, effective CG involves protecting
stakeholder rights and providing a means to enforce those rights by monitoring executives in
6

charge of running corporations. Second, good CG provides the necessary basis to solve or
mediate the divergent interests of corporate stakeholders. Third, good CG promotes an
environment of transparency or good quality reporting/disclosures. Finally, good CG involves
the provision of strategic and ethical guidance for the company.
Similar to CG, the concept of CSR is also associated with multiple definitions and
interpretations (Dahlsrud, 2008). However, there is a general consensus among scholars that
the term CSR refers to the means through which a company addresses the social, economic and
environmental demands of stakeholders as well as the financial demands from shareholders
(Aguilera et al., 2015; Schacter, 2005).
Theocratical framework in CSR and CSR
The historical overview shows that CG and CSR are two independent constructs, with distinct
characteristics (Jain and Jamali 2019). However, due to the multiplicity associated with the
definition, both have attracted wide scholarly attention across multiple disciplines. Its
application in different disciplines has meant that there are multiple lenses through which to
analyse the concepts of CG and CSR. Equally, there is not a generally accepted theory on CG
and CSR interfaces (Jain & Jamali, 2016). Prior studies have selected one, or different
combinations of theoretical perspectives (agency theory, stakeholder theory, institutional
theory legitimacy theory and resources dependence theory) (Aguinis & Glavas, 2012; Glavas,
2016; Jain & Jamali, 2016; Pisani et al., 2017; Rezaee, 2016) to explore CG and CSR interfaces.
Of these approaches, stakeholder theory is the most dominant and widely adopted theoretical
perspective in the larger common law jurisdiction – US, UK, AUS and Canada (Jain & Jamali,
2016) – from which New Zealand has adopted many ideas and principles, including CG and
CSR.
We draw on the insights of stakeholder theory to explain CG-CSR interfaces in New Zealand
for two important reasons. First, it broadens CG issues (i.e. boards’ responsibilities towards
stakeholders rather than just providers of capital), contributing to stakeholders' management
decisions based on who and what counts (Jamali, 2008; Jamali et al., 2008). Second, it
facilitates increased awareness of CSR in CG structures that not only enables more informed
decisions based on stakeholder satisfaction (Mitchell et al., 1997) but also remains important
for accountability of these practices (Atkins & Maroun, 2018; Perrini & Tencati, 2006;
Sardinha et al., 2011).
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Stakeholder Theory
Stakeholder theory is concerned with the relationship between a firm and its stakeholders. The
roots of stakeholder theory can be traced in the literature back to Ansoff’s work in 1965 (cited
in Roberts, 1992). However, the theory waned until the mid-1980s. Freeman was the first to
use stakeholder theory in the business management literature (Freeman (1984). Stakeholder
theory states that firms have relationships with a broad set of stakeholders, including
employees, consumers, environmental regulators, government agencies and other shareholders
(Freeman, 1984). Freeman (1984) argues that a firm should be characterised by its relationship
with its stakeholders. He defines stakeholders as “any group or individual who can affect or is
affected by the achievement of the organisation’s objectives” (p. 46). The stakeholder view of
Freeman held significant implications in the literature, but the Freeman classification of
stakeholders was too broad. However, later developments in stakeholder theory classified
stakeholders as groups or individuals who have a legitimate interest in a firm (Donaldson &
Preston, 1995; Mitchell et al., 1997). This classification serves the purpose of diverse
stakeholders’ expectations and needs. A firm has to meet those diverse stakeholders’
expectations rather than only relying on the fulfilment of shareholders’ needs.
There are two assumptions related to the fulfilment of diverse stakeholders’ needs:
accountability and fairness. In terms of accountability, stakeholder theory argues that a firm is
accountable to multiple stakeholders rather than merely to its shareholders (Deegan, 2013). In
this view, firms need to perform activities that can be justified in the eyes of diverse
stakeholders (Deegan, 2013). The second assumption states that firms’ interactions with
stakeholders should be based on principles of fairness (Bridoux & Stoelhorst, 2014). Fairness
contributes to a firm in three ways. First, it establishes the process to divide the value created
by the nexus of stakeholders among different parties per their proportion of stake in the firm
(Cropanzano et al., 2001). Thus, it reflects a firm’s open and honest image to the stakeholder.
Second, it reduce the contract cost to a certain extent, as a firm’s commitment to stakeholders
in the fairness concept is derived through trust and self-enforcement rather than legal
enforcement (Deegan, 2013; Richman, 2006). Finally, firms’ relationships with stakeholders
tend to last longer (Dyer, 1996), which can generate greater value. The relevancy of stakeholder
theory in the New Zealand context is established by the Companies Act 1993. It empowers
companies to name any person as an “entitled person” to invoke statuary remedy against the
operation and unfair prejudice or discrimination among other responsibilities. There are no
8

apparent limitations on the constituencies that might be included in this category, allowing
companies to include employees, suppliers, or any stakeholder as entitled persons. This
framework also offers interesting possibilities to institutionalise the stakeholder principle in
CG — shouldering more responsibilities on those charged with governance to make companies
responsible to all stakeholders. In addition, the revised CG code (i.e. the 2017 NZX CG code)
also emphasises that boards of directors should respect shareholders’ rights and should foster
a constructive relationship and engagement with shareholders as well as stakeholders —
justifying the relevance of stakeholders’ theory in the New Zealand socioeconomic context.
CG and CSR relationship
Stakeholder theory argues that both CG and CSR are important in managing and protection
of multiple stakeholders’ interest (Aguilera et al., 2006). Although the two have traditionally
evolved in relatively independent and compartmentalised streams of literature, there are signs
of interdependence, overlaps and convergence between CG and CSR (Jain & Jamali, 2016).
For instance, at one hand, the CG literature highlights the role of CG in the development of
effective stakeholder management in order to have a better corporate understanding of CSR
(Aguilera et al., 2006; Frynas & Yamahaki, 2016; Jain & Jamali, 2016). On other hand, CSR
literature emphasises the need to uphold higher standards of responsibility in terms of
organisational management, which in turn has implications for effective CG (Jamali, 2008;
Jamali et al., 2008).
Similarly, in CG the most important principle includes the accountability of companies
operations towards the protection of stakeholders interests (Aras & Crowther, 2008; Short et
al., 1999), while CSR comprises companies’ responsibility towards diverse stakeholders, such
as the wider community and the environment, with special emphasis on accountability in the
decision-making process (Adams & Zutshi, 2004; Aras et al., 2017; Atkins & Maroun, 2018;
Carroll & Buchholtz, 2014). Such overlaps set CG-CSR research to progress along with three
directions. The first strand adopts CSR as a function for CG (Bhuiyan et al., 2020; Filatotchev
& Stahl, 2015; Young & Thyil, 2014). The second strand portrays CSR as a dimension of CG
(Amoako, 2017; Frynas, 2010; Ho, 2005; Jian & Lee, 2015; Stanwick & Stanwick, 2001).
While the third strand visualises CG and CSR as coexisting components of the same continuum
(Amoako, 2017; Elkington, 2006). We elaborate on these concepts in the following section.
CSR as a function of CG
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This view emphasises the requirement of an effective CG structure to be in place before
proceeding with CSR strategies implementation. Scholars under this view argue that the
implementation of an effective CSR agenda is impossible without having solid CG practices in
place. In this regard, Hancock (2005) presents an excellent CSR framework by identifying the
key pillars of CSR. Among other important pillars for CSR, CG remained pivotal. CG is
considered as a building block of CSR under this notion (Jamali et al., 2008).
Consistency, with the views of scholars, considers that effective CG companies are more
likely to engage in CSR activities (e.g. Elkington, 2006; Filatotchev & Stahl, 2015; GarcíaSánchez et al., 2015; Husted, 2003; Jo & Harjoto, 2014; Kock et al., 2012; Young & Thyil,
2014). Majority of empirics’ literature focuses on the effectiveness of CG structure (i.e. board
composition, board committees, internal control i.e. audit structure and ownership structure)
on companies CSR performance (e.g. Benjamin et al., 2019; Biswas et al., 2018; Jo & Harjoto,
2014; Kock et al., 2012; Nadeem et al., 2017). However, the findings of this literature large
remained inconclusive. One strand of literature found that effective CG increases CSR (Jain &
Jamali, 2016; Rao & Tilt, 2016). While others found negative and no association of CG on
CSR (Jain & Jamali, 2016).
CSR as a dimension of CG
The second strand portrays CSR as a dimension of CG. It suggests that CSR does not only
reflect the CG structure, but it can shape them. Scholars attribute this concept with recent
listing and reporting requirement i.e. the recent NZX revised CG Code (2017) focusing on nonfinancial disclosure, the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) CG Principles on Sustainability
Reporting (2014), the Singapore Stock Exchange (SSE) Sustainability Reporting Guide (2016),
the mandatory ESG disclosure of listed firms on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) and the
US Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (2010), in which companies
were required to incorporate CSR as part of their CG compliance1 (Zaman, 2018).

1

For more about the CSR guidelines for the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX), the Bombay Stock Exchange
(BSE), the New Zealand Stock Exchange (NZX), and the Singaporean Exchange Limited (SGX) please see, ASX
Corporate Governance Council. (2014). Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations.
http://www.asx.com.au/documents/asx-compliance/cgc-principles-and-recommendations-3rd-edn.pdf,
Bombay Stock Exchange. (2013). Regulatory Requirements.
http://www.bseindia.com/static/about/regulatory_requirements.aspx?expandable=4, New Zealand Stock
Exchange. (2017). NZX Corporate Governance Code. https://www.nzx.com/files/attachments/257864.pdf and
Singapore Exchange Limited. (2016). SGX-ST Listing Rules, Practice Note 7.6.
http://rulebook.sgx.com/net_file_store/new_rulebooks/s/g/SGX_Mainboard_Practice_Note_7.6_July_20_201
6.pdf
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CSR as a dimension of CG extending CG duties, consider CSR as a tool to promote
effective and responsible governance. Scholars under this depiction argue that consideration of
CSR policies and practices promotes stakeholder engagement, which is the key function of
effective CG (i.e. effective CG is all about the protection of stakeholder rights (Aoki, 2010).
For example, Jun (2016), considering the CSR as a dimension of CG suggest that institutional
pressures coming from the United Nations (UN), such as UN-backed international CSR
guidelines, have led companies to adopt sound governance structures since these are perceived
to provide the necessary companies level infrastructure to accelerate CG. Another study by
Kong (2013) suggests that CSR positively affects minority investors’ participation in corporate
governance (Kong, 2013). Researchers considering CSR as a dimension of CG also found that
high responsible companies follow fair executive compensation packages (i.e. a mechanism of
CG) (Cai et al., 2011; Maas, 2018).
CG and CSR coexist
The third strand visualises CG and CSR as coexisting constructs (e.g Bhimani &
Soonawalla, 2005; Campbell, 2006; Li et al., 2010; Ortas et al., 2015; Sacconi, 2006). Bhimani
and Soonawalla (2005) note that good corporate performance is not possible without corporate
conformity. For example, they consider that poor CG and misleading financial statements are
one side of the corporate coin – the other side [is] poor CSR’ (Bhimani & Soonawalla, 2005).
They further introduce a firm continuum where corporate performance is at one end and
conformity on the other, meaning that firms should take an integrated approach towards
reconciling conformity and performance reporting issues. Jamali et al. (2008) further elaborate
on this continuum, noting that legally binding requirements are being increasingly embodied
in governance mechanisms requiring compliance and conformity, and self‐regulatory
stakeholder and CSR initiatives, which are evidence of voluntary corporate social performance.
This view of corporate continuum sees CG and CSR as part of the same continuum. Under this
view, a successful company without CSR will only be considered a half-successful and a failed
company will be the one that has poor CG as one-half and bad CSR at another half (Aras &
Crowther, 2008; Elkington, 2006).
The emergence of these interfaces is because CG and CSR are multi-disciplinary constructs
that create a uniformity of goals within and across companies (Aras & Crowther, 2008). The
underlying relationship between CG and CSR focuses on those organisational activities that
have a substantial impact on stakeholders and the external environment (Kolk, 2008; O’Dwyer,
2003; Short et al., 1999; Solomon, 2007). Therefore, it is important to understand the
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connection and interdependency between CG and CSR. Despite the growing interest in CG and
CSR research, the exact nature of this relationship has not yet been completely determined
(Frynas & Yamahaki, 2016; Jain & Jamali, 2016; Zaman, 2018). We argue that the relationship
between CG and CSR is a complex, but a vital one for each of discuss logics and merit further
academic attention.
In addition, to the nature of complexity in the relationship between CG and CSR, there are
challenges that have the potential to impact managerial perception about CG and CSR
(Bebbington et al., 2009; O'Dwyer et al., 2005; Woodward et al., 2001). In line with stakeholder
theory perspective, both CG and CSR aims to promote accountability through effective
stakeholders’ engagement (Cooper & Owen, 2007). However, accountability and stakeholder
engagement processes consume a considerable amount of company resources and often depend
on managerial perception (Atkins & Maroun, 2018; Farooq & De Villiers, 2019). For example,
the companies would need to spend both time and money to ensure their actions comply with
codes of conduct (a CG mechanism). Similarly, CSR practices also need resources in the form
of improved employment benefits, community engagement, technological innovation to
prevent certain emissions and, sometimes, charitable activities. In addition, executives who
wish to make their organisations better corporate citizens face significant obstacles (Kaur &
Lodhia, 2019). If they undertake costly initiatives that their rivals do not embrace, they risk
eroding their competitive positions. An appropriate allocation of resources towards CG and
CSR implementation could result in organisation’s value maximization, whereas an
overinvestment (i.e. managers invest in CSR due to their personal gains) might result in
compromising the rights of one stakeholders’ group i.e. shareholders (Barnea & Rubin, 2010).
Therefore, to develop a better understanding and to uncover the nature of the CG-CSR
relationship, this study is an attempt to answer an important yet less explored research question
in the New Zealand socio-economic context: How do NZX listed firms’ executives perceive the
nature of the relationship between CG and CSR?
Research Methodology
A ‘purposive sampling’2 is adopted in which we locate managers working in NZX listed
firms who are actively engaged in promoting CSR or at least claim to be socially responsible.
2

In purposive sampling, the participants are selected either by key characteristics, such as knowledge, skills and

demographics or other attributes that are best suited to the study research questions for better understanding of the
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We select NZX listed firms because listed firms, in comparison with non-listed entities, face
greater regulation around CG and are expected to set an example for other companies. Thus,
listed entities offer a good population for addressing the research sample specifications.
Second, to answer the study research question, we require informed participants that are
familiar with CSR processes (Farooq & De Villiers, 2017, 2019). Firms' management
undertaking CSR activities are considered as informed participants for this study. To do this,
we search the GRI database to identify firms publishing CSR reports that meet the requirements
of internationally recognised standards3. Such firms may be considered the industry leaders in
terms of adopting CSR, or at least in their claims of adopting CSR. Of note, we explicitly
verified all NZX listed company’s website to rule out any possibility of companies being
excluded from the GRI database despite following GRI standard. This process results in 18
companies meeting the pre-determined sampling criteria.
After finalising the sample, we then search for study participants and their contact
information. We develop a database of our sampled firms, containing publicly available
information about executive leaders, including name, designation, LinkedIn profile, and email
address or phone number. We then contact the participants via email or phone, inviting them
to participate in our study based on their involvement in organisational CSR processes. We
have selected one participant from each firm and we explicitly mention, in our email scripts
that if they believe there is someone else in their organisation more suitable (based on
familiarity with CSR), we would appreciate them forwarding this email to them. This ensures
the informed participants' criteria of the study. Once a manager agrees to participate, we send
an email outlining the scope and aim of the study, the rights of participants and a participant
consent form.
Of the 18 companies, six declines the interview invitation on grounds such as internal
restructuring, management re-shuffling and overall busy-ness. Finally, we were able to
interview 12 company managers, the number of interviewees appears reasonable regarding the
topic and scope of our study (Parker & Northcott, 2016), given the limited number of NZX

research phenomena Parker, L. D., & Northcott, D. (2016). Qualitative generalising in accounting research:
concepts and strategies. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal. We adopt purposive sampling, as a
limited number of NZX listed firms have a formal CSR program Dobbs, S., & Van Staden, C. (2016). Motivations
for corporate social and environmental reporting: New Zealand evidence. Sustainability Accounting, Management
and Policy Journal, 7(3), 449-472. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1108/SAMPJ-08-2015-0070 .
3

KPMG (2017) notes that the most popular CSR reporting standards used are the GRI guidelines.
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listed companies having formal CSR programs (Dobbs & Van Staden, 2016) and the
characteristics of the interviewees in this research, the majority of them being senior
management. We also monitor data saturation throughout the coding process. We find no new
code emerges after the 10th interview. However, we also include two additional interviews to
ensure and confirm data saturation, which reaches a total of 12 interviews.

Interview protocol

We design an interview protocol to help the interviewers and to encourage participants to
relax and talk freely (Hermanowicz, 2002). The interview protocol contains a welcome note,
the interview purpose, interview format and a set of interview questions, supported by
additional questions to enable interviewers to delve deeper and explore sub-themes (Farooq &
De Villiers, 2019). The set of questions included the following topics: (1) CG and CSR
practices in the organization, (2) CG and CSR barriers and (3) The relationship between CG
and CSR. After establishing the interview protocol, the researcher organised a pilot study. Pilot
interviews enable a researcher to identify ambiguities, difficulties and unnecessary questions
and subsequently to discard or modified them. It also increases the validity of the research
instruments by determining that interview questions are appropriate (Van Teijlingen et al.,
2001). To perform the pilot study, four organisations outside4 the NZX listing requirement
were identified. The CSR managers of these firms were contacted using their details, identified
via organisational websites. The pilot study interviews revealed that the interview protocol
proved that the information provided was clear and sufficient.

Interviews
All the interviews are conducted face-to-face at the respondents’ company offices, located in
three New Zealand cities – Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch – between February and
August 2017. Of note, to avoid biases resulting from the differences arising out of the multi
teams involved in the interview process, the lead researcher undertook all the interviews and

4

The current research used slightly different criteria for selecting the pilot study respondent as compared to main
study sample criteria, due to a lower number of actual respondent companies. We selected four organisations
based on the GRI criteria, while relaxing the NZX listing requirement. These differences in the sampling
procedure for pilot study had two benefits; first the study achieved the pilot study benefits without losing the
actual sample. Second; this meant that the study was able to include unlisted firm feedback and gain industrial
insight into CSR practices in New Zealand companies.

14

transcription. To ensure reliability, we have followed several steps, such as the development of
an interview guide, the pilot testing of interviews, the adoption of face-to-face semi-structured
interviews, the audio recording of all interviews, the preference for self-interview transcription
(rather than third party transcription) and the presentation of long raw data in the analysis.
Further, to maintain validity, we followed purposive sampling to identify informed senior
managers of NZX listed firms. These senior managers were in a position to best describe the
research problem.
The majority of interviewees are in executive management positions, such as chief
financial officer (CFO), company secretary, executive general manager, head of government
relations, and CSR and general manager of sustainability. The average interview time is 47
minutes, with a minimum of 39 minutes and a maximum of 62 minutes. Table 1 provides a
summary of the interviews conducted.
Insert Table 1 about here
Thematic analysis

We transcribe audio interviews and validate them from the interviewee (Gibbs, 2002). We
then apply thematic analysis to identify codes and themes using the N-Vivo 11 software (Gibbs,
2002). More specifically, we start with open coding – line-by-line reading of the transcripts
and creating the code names for the issue discussed – resulting in 107 codes. The process is
repeated, where issues related to sub-themes and linked themes are also developed based on
the interview guide. The final themes and sub-themes that emerge from the interviews are
presented in Table 2 and are reflected in our findings section.
Insert Table 2 about here

Findings and Discussion

We identify and explain three themes with the aim of developing a better understanding of
CG and CSR interfaces.

CG practices assessment
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All interviewees discuss ways in which their institutions integrate multiple CG aspects into
their firms’ practices, with the most frequently highlighted aspects those revolving around
compliance, transparency and disclosure.:
“…. Good CG is about saying decisions, transparency, the way you
govern these businesses and execute your duties to achieve certain
standards…. [SM11]”
Further inquiry about their firm CG practices shows that firms in the current study exhibited
mixed ownership structures (i.e. institutional, family, government and individuals). However,
the majority of our sampled firms possess block-holding (an excess of 5% of shares belong to
single shareholders), contrary to the US and the UK where corporate ownership is more diverse
(Chung et al., 2010; Fox et al., 2012; Holderness, 2007; Jiang et al., 2009; Kong, 2013). The
majority of scholars argue that large bock holding being central to firms might have different
interests from those minority shareholdings (Edmans, 2009). Large shareholding thus may
have more influence on the company than dispersed small shareholders due to their strong
incentives and more effective monitoring (Alleyne et al., 2014; Del Guercio et al., 2008; Jiang,
2009; Jiang et al., 2009). For instance, these shareholders structure can provide external
monitoring and direct dialogues with top management and therefore, the higher percentage of
block holders are in a better position to protect their rights than minority shareholders – leading
to better CG practices (as minority shareholders protection is the core of effective CG)
(Aguilera et al., 2015).
In the majority of cases, the firms have well-structured and gender-diverse boards. On
average, they have eight directors. In half of the cases, the firms have remuneration policies for
board members as well as executives, highlighting the link between remuneration and
performance. As one of the interviewees stated:
“…. the CEO is awarded […] against financial, health and safety
strategic goals are met… [SM3]”
In all cases, the firms have developed codes and policies for CG and are disclosing the relevant
information to shareholders and stakeholders.
“We have codes of conduct in place [….] from diversity, inclusivity
through to delegated authority and financial policies as well…[SM2]”
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Apparently, CG code and disclosure practices reflect compliance type of CG.
However, upon inquiry, the managers have specifically emphasized the broader
scope of such practices for the protection of minority shareholders.
“……You are not giving light disclosures about things that have
happened or fear of insider trading or all those sorts of other things
that can really impact on a local market, so it’s about attracting
international shareholders, as much as investors as much as it is about
creating surety for mom and dad shareholders, that you are using their
money under best ways…. [SM11]”
These CG practices indicate the strength of the CG structure for our sampled firms,
attributing them to the NZX strategic guidelines and the regular monitoring of internal control
mechanisms. However, there is ample evidence from the above quote such as health and safety
linked compensation schemes, code of conduct for diversity and inclusivity, and due diligence
for minority shareholders that managers in NZX listed firms follow the stakeholders-oriented
CG rather than shareholder centric CG model.
Despite having good CG practices, respondents highlight resource heaviness and a lack of
shareholder pressure as barriers to promote best CG practices. First, one is indicated as a barrier
for effective CG by six interviewees and is noted by one of the interviewees as
“…There are two parts to that resource heaviness. There’s obviously
legal compliance, I have a lawyer who will do it, who will focus on, and
that pretty much for a company this size, if you are doing the board
agenda’s it’s probably a full-time job […] it also consumes quite a lot
of board time… [SM4]”.
These senior management’s concerns for CG implementation reflect the NZX contextual
settings5. Additional inquiry of the reasons for being resource heaviness has established the
linked this with small capital structure. The managers particular are not happy with the nonconsideration of company size in NZX CG principle implementations.

5

NZX is a relatively small stock exchange with a total market capitalisation of only US$98.68 billion at end of
the January 2018 period. It represents just 0.32% of the Asia Pacific region, well behind its regional counterparts
– Australia, Japan, Korea and Singapore (World Federation of Exchanges 2018). Due to their small capitalisation,
NZX listed firms find it hard to balance the time and costs associated with these CG practices, as indicated by one
of the respondents
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“We are a small company, so the same rules apply, no matter what size
company you are. So, in a larger company, they’ll have an investor’s
relations team and they’ll have a corporate secretarial team and we
don’t have that so that’s the main barrier, it’s actually just resources...
[SM5]”.
There is considerable evidence to suggest that regulatory burdens on firms and businesses
have increased significantly with resource requirements in terms of the time and costs
associated with gaining an understanding of new and amended compliance imperatives
(MacNeil & Li, 2006; Short et al., 1999). Hence, it is vital for NZX where a significant number
of firms have small capital structures to introduce the size-specific CG provisions.
Second, the lack of shareholder activism is also reported as barriers to effective CG
implementation.
“I think, there is a lack of pressure to improve, you know, we do not have a degree
of shareholder activism in this country [SM11]”.
Shareholder activism reflects the pressure exerted by shareholders to influence company
policies and practices (Aguilera et al., 2015). Although shareholder activism encompasses
activities such as letters of warning, proxy battles, litigation, discussion with corporate
managers and annual general meeting proposals (Admati & Pfleiderer, 2009; Aguilera et al.,
2015), the majority of the CG research focuses on the shareholder proposal – a written
recommendation form shareholders formally submitted to a company advocating a particular
course of action (Aguilera et al., 2015). The added benefits brought by shareholders are well
documented in the existing literature; shareholders not only influence firms’ financial
performance but are also considered important in terms of encouraging firms to adopt best CG
practices (Brav et al. 2008; Del Guercio et al. 2008). However, the NZX listed companies,
despite having highly concentrated ownership, generally lacks shareholder activists, which
might be one of the reasons these firms lag in terms of certain CG activities (i.e. disclosure of
executive remuneration etc.) (Jiang et al., 2009). Even though NZX listed firms have higher
levels of institutional ownership and tend to be highly concentrated, their ability or willingness
to monitor firm management is at best weak (Jiang 2009). One of the potential reasons for
ineffective shareholder pressure seems related to the geographic dispersion of ownership
patterns (Jiang 2009). In addition, there might be a tension between shareholder centric
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activism that promotes information transparency and disclosure (a mechanism of CG), while
stakeholders centric activism focuses more on making companies accountable towards society
(Aguilera et al., 2015). Therefore, it is recommended that local institutional shareholding
improve to bring about effective monitoring and tension between shareholder centric activism
and stakeholder centric activism need to be considered.
Despite these limitations (i.e. CG being labelled as resources heavy and the absence of
shareholder activists in firm ownership structures) and compliance requirement, we have asked
respondents about the motives to engage effective CG practices. The managers seem to achieve
stakeholder satisfaction as core motives of effective CG – reiterating the stakeholder concept
of CG among NZX listed firms.
“Good quality CG attracts [stakeholders]…. poor quality CG practices
turn the [stakeholders] off from the business…[SM11]”.
Overall this study of NZX listed firms reveals a moderated CG structure. However, contrary to
other developed countries, like the US, the UK and Australia, we found that in some CG aspect
NZX listed companies still lag (i.e. higher concentrated ownership structures, a lack of policies
for remuneration and remuneration disclosure). We also summarised these results in Table 3.
Panel A reports the descriptive statistics of board composition, while Panel B shows a summary
of ownership structure and CG policies assessments highlighted by the participants
CSR practices assessment

CSR is a relatively new and developing field in the New Zealand context. Interviewees are
asked to discuss what CSR means to their organisation, with a significant number of managers
consistently referring to the community and the environment.
“...understanding the positive and negative environmental and social
impacts we have and reducing the environmental impacts and
increasing the positive social ones in line with our business purpose or
you know, what your business does [SM8]”.
The community-related CSR concept covers several aspects, such as the promotion of
gender diversity, sponsoring sports events, running literacy programmes, providing cost19

effective services and engagement with local communities. Referring to the community aspect,
one interviewee notes
“...When we talk about corporate responsibility [….] we think about the
impacts on society, that our organisation has while performing its core
function… [SM1]”.
Apart from the community, the environment is another dominant theme in the discussion.
There is a clear focus on emission-reduction initiatives, and energy and waste reduction. For
both of these environmental issues, management teams have established formal programmes,
and they regularly review their environmental performance. As indicated by one of the senior
managers:
“…CSR is all about long term growth, minimising our […] environment
footprint… [SM10]”.
The increased engagement in environmental issues can be linked back to New Zealand
‘clean and green’ image slogan and Resource Management Act 191 that encourage companies
to undertake environmentally friendly activities (Collins et al., 2010; Khan & Lockhart, 2019).
The firms operating in New Zealand generally keep this slogan in mind when performing
business operations (Collins et al., 2010; Khan & Lockhart, 2019). Besides, firms seemingly
establish an environmental-focused CSR concept due to community concerns – New Zealand
communities see the environment as important. Notably, in New Zealand, there are no
mandatory CSR guidelines. In most cases, companies performed these practices to ensure
stakeholder satisfaction, legitimacy and generalised community commitment (Zaman &
Nadeem, 2019). From the above quote, it seems that the managers believe that voluntary
incorporation of CSR not only satisfy stakeholders (this supports stakeholder theory) but in
doing so they are also fulfilling their corporate responsibility.
Prior literature indicates that companies are likely to experience a wide range of barriers in
implementing CSR practices. These include the perception that CSR does not relate to their
business and resource constraints, particularly, financial, human and time limitations (Gray et
al., 1996; Hossain et al., 2016; Kaur & Lodhia, 2019; Mansi et al., 2017). These barriers may
be interdependent, i.e., a barrier can depend on another one. Identification of the specific
barriers and understanding their potential interdependencies may help managers to formulate
strategies to mitigate them (DeTienne & Lewis, 2005; Hossain et al., 2016). Our interviewees
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highlight the three most common barriers for their CSR journey: framework complexity,
limited understanding and cost-time balance.
The first barrier is framework complexity because of CSR is a multidimensional concept
and means different things to different people (Lozano, 2012; Murillo & Lozano, 2006;
Woodward et al., 2001). The subjective nature of CSR often poses challenges for managers
who formulate specific policies (Woodward et al., 2001). Several scholars have argued that the
too many frameworks and complexity associated with the application of these frameworks limit
effective CSR implementation (O'Dwyer et al., 2005; Pisani et al., 2017; Woodward et al.,
2001). Consistent with these arguments, our study also finds framework complexity as a key
barrier for CSR implementation, as pointed out by a participant
“…barriers is about the inconsistency and lack of clarity of CSR
framework... [SM10]”
Although NZX has issued the guidelines for ESG disclosure6, these guidelines are well short
of providing the framework for CSR implementation.
The second barrier is a limited understanding of CSR. Managers’ view is that there is a lack
of understanding among stakeholders about CSR; for instance, one of the managers indicates:
“…that other barriers are just people’s [stakeholders] understanding
and perceptions so not everybody would understand what you’re talking
about… [SM9]”.
CSR requires a firm’s commitment to its stakeholders and this commitment often involves
certain costs (Kaur & Lodhia, 2019; O'Dwyer et al., 2005; O’Dwyer, 2003; Woodward et al.,
2001). Managers expect that stakeholders acknowledge their effort regarding CSR initiatives;
however, limited understanding of CSR among stakeholders can negatively influence
organisational CSR efforts, resulting in stopping CSR investment (Kaur & Lodhia, 2019). This
effect is more intense among firms operating in markets where CSR implementation is based
on managerial voluntary discretion, like New Zealand. Management in those firms may choose
to cease CSR investment if stakeholders are not recognising firms’ CSR commitment.
The third barrier for effective CSR implementations is the cost and time to undertake CSR
activities. As CSR practices cannot be implemented overnight, it is a task which requires
substantial time and financial resources (Kaur & Lodhia, 2019; O'Dwyer et al., 2005; O’Dwyer,
6

NZX Environmental, Social and Governance Guidance Note (2017): http://nzx-prod-s7fsd7f98s.s3-website-apsoutheast-2.amazonaws.com/attachments/NZXR/311692/271467.pdf.
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2003) and needs to be communicated to all management levels (Lodhia et al., 2020).
Additionally, firms need to modify their current strategies and/or make structural changes to
existing governance practices. Six managers in this study indicate that the cost-time balance
hinders them from being able to effective implementation of CSR practices. One interviewee’s
response is
“…there’s cost [….] and cost not just in terms of […] obviously
sponsorship is a direct cost but cost in terms of the product, cost of the
products you buy but also the time it takes, you’ve got to do, you’ve got
to spend a lot of time cross-functionally, you have to engage all functions
in the business… [SM5]”.
This is directly linked with the small capital structure of NZX listed companies compared with
the UK or US firms, which potentially may affect CSR implementation (Roush et al., 2012).
Given these barriers and the fact that CSR implementation is voluntary, we also ask why
sampled firms engage in CSR practices. Interviewees note its benefits, mainly self-interest ones
(Jamali et al. 2008). Senior managers appreciate the short-term and long-term benefits of CSR,
particularly in terms of increasing profitability as well as improving firm credibility and
trustworthiness in the eyes of internal and external stakeholders. One manager responds that
CSR activities
“…directly impact on the future profitability of the […] company. So,
that was the driver, the initial driver for creating the sustainability
role… [SM2]”.
Overall, we find that stakeholders’ understanding of CSR as well as the time and costs
associated with implementation, hinder the development of CSR practices. Firms intending to
implement CSR policies should consider these barriers, by developing and revising their CSR
strategies accordingly. Table 3 Panel C displays a summary of the barriers to CG and CSR
implementation.

CG-CSR relationship assessment
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After identifying CG and CSR practices and the barriers that NZX listed firms face in
implementing these practices, interviewees are asked about the nature of the relationship
between CG and CSR. The analysis reveals diverse managerial perceptions about the nature of
the CG and CSR relationship. Three major themes emerge: (1) CG as a pillar of CSR, (2) CSR
as a dimension of CG and (3) CG and CSR coexist. Figure 1 shows a diagram with these three
types of relationships.
Insert Figure 1 about here

CSR as a function of CG

CG as a function of CSR is the most dominant among the themes identified. Seven out of
12 respondents state that they consider CG as a function of CSR. According to the interviewees,
good CG entails ensuring that firms operate in a socially responsible way, implying that the
conception of CSR is necessarily anchored in a strong CG foundation. Likewise, one of the
managers responds:
“Well, the ideal relationship is that our governance will lead
sustainability out across the organisation… [SM3]”.
The manager suggests that the nature of CG invariability persuades managers and
executives to emphasise particular goals and objectives concerning CSR. Another manager
highlights the role of governance in CSR stating:
“...relationship depends so much on the makeup of your governance
structure and the level of appetite that the various parties involved,
actually have around CSR, and if it’s there from the outset, then yes it
would be driven by the governance feeding into it... [SM9]”.
These views are consistent with Jamali et al. (2008), who consider that firms having
effective CG strategies are more likely to engage in CSR activities. Extending this, Harjoto and
Jo (2011) argue that in firms with effective CG, managers utilise CSR practices to reduce
conflict between shareholders and stakeholders. In turn, fewer conflicts enhance stakeholder
satisfaction and result in higher performance for shareholders. One of the managers summed it
up as:
“…it’s inevitable if your business is run with good CG then this would
be reflected in how you manage CSR. I think, having strong CG
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practices that kind of philosophy embedded into the resource and ethics
of the organisation can benefit the CSR, and associated with superior
performance… [SM2]”.
This conception of CG-CSR allows practitioners and researchers to explore how different
configurations of CG structures and processes influence firms’ CSR policies and practices (Jain
and Jamali 2016). We are not surprised by the significant number of interviewees viewing CSR
as function CG since the majority of CG-CSR literature is based on this belief (Jain & Jamali,
2016). More specifically, this notion relies on the effectiveness of several CG mechanisms –
such as the composition of boards of directors, ownership structures and CEO compensation –
and firm-specific CSR performance measures, predominantly rooted in agency and stakeholder
theory (Benjamin et al., 2019; Biswas et al., 2018; Harjoto & Jo, 2011; Jain & Jamali, 2016).
In line with stakeholder theory, this perception of CG as a function of CSR has established
an important role of CG mechanisms, such as boards and ownership structure, first, in setting
corporate strategies including CSR strategies (Benjamin et al., 2019; Biswas et al., 2018;
Nadeem et al., 2017), and second for effective monitoring of management to prevent
irresponsible actions (Adams & Zutshi, 2004; Jain & Zaman, 2019). This view also assists
policymakers and practitioners intended to promote CSR, as in the absence of good CG, the
CSR initiatives might not be sustained.

CSR as a dimension of CG

The second theme that emerges from the interviews is the belief that CSR is a dimension
of CG. Four out of 12 respondents favour this theme. CSR as a dimension of CG is the most
sophisticated conception of CG because it provides a wider definition of CG and considers
non-financial risk within the dimension of CG activities (Jamali et al. 2008). One of the
manager’s views is
“…corporate governance layer is there to provide oversight to the
whole of the organisational activities. And CSR should be an element of
the overall governance… [SM7]”.
This perspective employs CSR as an extension of CG, wherein CG expands the concept of
fiduciary duty from shareholders to multi-stakeholders, including shareholders (Sacconi,
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2011). In this view, there should be a clear ethical basis for businesses complying with the
accepted norm of the society in which they are operating. One of the managers sums it up in
the following manner
“CSR is a form of corporate governance, yes. It’s a […]. It’s kind of a
[….] you know it’s actually making sure that you are operating the
company in an ethical way so… [SM5]”.
These findings are consistent with Young and Thyil (2014), who find that CSR is an
integral part of CG. Proponents with those who see CSR as a dimension of CG argue that being
responsible to society – seen as an external responsibility – and to employees – seen as an
internal responsibility – should be part of CG formulas and structures (Ho, 2005). Consistent
with previous studies, CG embedding CSR policies and practices can promote stakeholder
engagement, including customers, employees and society (Jamali, 2008). These are associated
with effective governance, such as establishing transparent executive compensation (Mahoney
& Thorne, 2005) and attracting institutional shareholders (Graves & Waddock, 1994). These
practices are believed to yield business-related benefits not only for firms and shareholders but
also for other stakeholders (Graves & Waddock, 1994; Greening & Gray, 1994). This view
challenges agency theory by promoting a stakeholder governance model that is effectively
derived from CSR policies and strategies (Kong, 2013).

CG and CSR coexist

That CG and CSR coexist is the third and final theme that emerges in our interviews with
managers. This prospect is summarised by one of the participants:
“…you can’t be a bad corporate citizen and expect to have the revenues,
you can’t expect to have poor corporate governance practices and
expect shareholders to support and invest in you. So, they are the
underlying factors to your success as a company… [SM4]”.
This argument suggests that CG and CSR are complementary and coexisting components
of the same accountability continuum. In other words, the presence of CG standards and
policies cannot replace a firm’s commitment to society and the environment, rather both exist
side by side (Bhimani & Soonawalla, 2005). In this domain, CG has received more scholarly
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attention; however, this has been counterbalanced by some interest in CSR. This is not
surprising given that while CG is mandatory, CSR is not. In this viewpoint, firms are
increasingly expected to address CG and CSR issues simultaneously. The emergence of ESG
indexes and GRI reporting could be seen as a catalyst to promote this type of CG-CSR
relationship in New Zealand firms. Viewing CG and CSR through this lens seems that both CG
and CSR are not the same thing nor different rather an interrelated or reinforcing constructs. In
their co-existence, CG emphasises on external compliance and monitoring and development of
internal control, while CSR focus is more on the firm’s self-regulation and their commitment
to stakeholders.
Conclusion and Limitations
Drawing on 12 face-to-face interviews with senior executives of ‘CSR champion’ NZX
listed firms, this paper aims to explore the CG-CSR relationship using a New Zealand context.
To do this, one broad research question is, how do NZX listed firms’ executives perceive the
nature of the relationship between CG and CSR?
First, the assessment of CG and CSR practices indicates management awareness and
engagement. The most frequently highlighted aspects for CG revolve around compliance,
transparency and disclosure, specifically codes of conduct, board committees, diversity and
independence, while the CSR concept is mainly dominated by environmental and communityrelated aspects, such as community engagement and event sponsorships. Second, exploring the
barriers for CG and CSR adoption, we find compliance costs and a lack of shareholder pressure
as barriers for CG, while lacking resources, framework complexity and the limited
understanding of CSR are mentioned as barriers for effective implementation of CSR among
NZX listed firms. Third, exploring the nature of the CG-CSR relationship, our findings suggest
that most respondents appreciate the increasing convergence between CG and CSR and believe
that more robust CG frameworks will lead to more sustainable CSR practices. In this regard,
our evidence shows that the CSR agenda is the responsibility of top leadership.
This paper attempts to explore the relationship between CG and CSR based on the views
of the senior leadership of NZX listed firms. Previous studies in New Zealand focus either on
CG or CSR (Dobbs and Van Staden 2016), ignoring the nature of the CG and CSR relationship.
We include both CG and CSR in this exploration aiming to better understand the link between
them. This paper also has important implications for not only the managers and policymakers
of New Zealand but also for countries that similar to New Zealand. Our analysis indicates that
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the nature of a firm’s CG practices sets the overall tone for the organisation’s CSR activities.
Therefore, practitioners and policymakers who intend to develop and promote CSR are
required to strengthen firms’ governance structure. These findings also confirm the
effectiveness of NZX’s recent initiatives, such as the revised CG Code in 2017, to empower
boards to improve CSR practices and therefore have important implications for regulators
across the globe.
Concurrently, mapping of barriers for CG and CSR also makes a significant contribution
to understanding CG and CSR aspects at the organisational level. For instance, one of the main
barriers identified in the analysis is the lack of resources; thus, managers and boards of directors
responsible for resource planning and management duties need to consider this restriction while
developing CG and CSR strategies. The findings are beneficial for education providers in
developing the understanding of CG and CSR relationship among business students since
Business Ethics and CSR concept is still in transition in many countries including New
Zealand. Our findings are also of interest for countries that are similar to New Zealand,
especially those with companies with small capital structures. Our findings are of value to
policymakers in that they recommend the consideration of resource requirements (i.e. financial
threshold) in designing CSR guidelines/polices, as companies in smaller markets see additional
CSR regulations as a burden on their resources which might have the potential to adversely
influence their revenue-generation ability.
We acknowledge some limitations of our study that provide worthwhile avenues for future
research. First, the small sample size limits the generalisability of the research findings and
hence additional research is required to test these outcomes. Second, we have not considered
the managerial and industry characteristics in discussing our results. The tension between
certain managerial characteristics, i.e., gender, designation and age, and industry
characteristics, such as environmental sensitivity, might worthy to explore in future studies.
Third, the findings are subject to social desirability bias, as managers might project good CG
and CSR practices onto their organisations. Future research could conduct interviews with a
wider range of stakeholders, which might provide added benefit in terms of identifying the
tensions involved in managing CSR programmes across different stakeholder groups and in
reducing social desirability bias. Fourth, we only consider CSR champion firms based on their
inclusion in GRI database to explore the nature of the CG and CSR relationship, and this does
not allow us to reflect on the general state of barriers for CG and CSR adoption in companies
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outside the scope. Thus, future research would be needed to consider companies other than
industry leaders.
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Table 1 Summary of interviewees and description of interview characteristics
SN

Code

1

SM1

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

SM2
SM3
SM4
SM5
SM6
SM7
SM8
SM9
SM10
SM11
SM12

Designation
Head of Government Relations
Corporate Responsibility
Sustainability Manager
Head of Sustainability
Executive General Manager
Chief Operating Officer & CFO
Governance & Sustainability Manager
Chief Financial Officer
Sustainability Manager
General Manager Sustainability
Company Secretary
Group Chief Financial Officer
Sustainability Manager

&

Company
Tenure
(years)

Qualification

Interview duration
(h: mm: ss)

Transcription (words)

07

BSc (Hons)

0:54:57

5877

10
03
05
07
03
08
03
02
06
03
05

MBA
BSc (Hons)
BSc (Hons)
BSc (Hons)
BSc/LLB (Hons)
BSc (Hons)
BSc (Hons), PG Dip.
MSc
LLB & B.S.Com
BA, AMP
LLM

0:42:01
0:41:20
0:50:15
0:45:03
0:40:50
0:44:31
0:41:05
0:50:22
0:38:52
1:02:11
0:52:42

4603
4003
7127
4199
4629
5334
5101
7874
3894
7706
7073

39

Table 2 Major themes and sub-themes
SN
Themes
1
Assessment of CG practices

2

Assessment of CSR practices

3

Assessment of CG-CSR relationships

Sub-themes
CG practices
Barrier to adopt CG
Motivations for CG
CSR practices
Barriers to adopt CSR
Motivations for CSR
CG as pillar for CSR
CSR as dimension of CG
CG and CSR coexist

Table 3 CG practices assessment
Descriptive Summary
Mean Median Min Max
7.3
7.5
6
8
6.6
7
4
8
2.4
2.5
1
4
2.9
3
2
4

Panel A: Board Composition Assessment
Total number of directors
Number of independent directors
Number of women directors
Number of board committees
Panel B: Ownership Structure and CG Policies Assessment
Presence of concentrated ownership
CSR-based matrix for executive remuneration
Presence of organisational codes and policies
Presence of disclosure policies
Panel C: Barriers to adopt CG and CSR
CG adoption Barriers
Resource heaviness
Lack of shareholder’s activism
CSR adoption Barriers
Framework complexity
Limited understanding about CSR
Cost and time balance
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Number of firms
12
5
12
12

Figure 1 The CG-CSR relationship
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